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 Abstract:  
This paper estimates a structural dynamic model of outmigration which incorporates 
several features of existing outmigration theories but distinguishes itself by 
introducing uncertainty about future earnings and preferences which allows 
immigrants to revise their duration decisions throughout their migration experience. 
Estimation results indicate that outmigration does not depend exclusively on earnings 
differentials. Immigrants are found to be forward looking decision makers, and 
simulations show that predicted migration durations can be very sensitive to changes 
in the economic environment, and differ considerably from those of a myopic model. 
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 1 Introduction
The increasing importance of immigrants leaving their host country, which we refer to as outmi-
gration, is a world wide phenomena (see Dustmann, 2003 and the references therein). The case of
Germany is interesting as migration out of Germany has been particularly important in the last
decades (see B¨ ohning, 1987; Glytsos, 1988 for stylized facts). These massive movements of hu-
man capital pose substantial problems for policy makers who must forecast inﬂows and outﬂows
of immigrants in order to adjust their immigration policies to ﬁt the future needs of their labor
markets. Moreover, it has recently been argued both theoretically and empirically that estimation
of existing measures of the economic assimilation of immigrants based on possibly non-random
samples of immigrants observed not to leave the country (e.g. Schultz, 1998; Edin, LaLonde, and
Aslund, 2000). For both these reasons, a growing body of literature has investigated the motives
behind outmigration.
Theories of outmigration typically build upon neo-classical static choice models of migration
(Sjaastad, 1962; Harris and Todaro, 1970) by assuming that an immigrant’s decision to outmigrate
is based on the comparison of his current expected earnings and those of a potential new des-
tination, often assumed to be the immigrant’s home country. A popular mechanism underlying
this paradigm is the notion that immigrants improve their earning position in the home country
while being abroad by investing in home-country speciﬁc skills (Dustmann, 1994). Outmigration
is then triggered when the relative increase in the returns to human capital in the home country is
sufﬁcient for the expected earnings in the home country to exceed those in the host country.
However, there is empirical evidence indicating that outmigration does occur despite persis-
tently higher expected earnings in the host country (e.g. Carrington, Detragiache and Vishwanath,
1996). In order to reconcile these empirical facts, theories of outmigration have shifted away from
theassumptionofexpectedearningscomparisonstoamoregeneraldecisionprocessinvolvingex-
pected utility comparisons (Djajic and Milbourne, 1988). This subtle change allows outmigration
to occur despite having relatively higher earnings in the host country, as long as the marginal util-
ity of consumption is sufﬁciently higher in the new destination than in the original host country.
Several extensions of the expected utility framework have provided new and interesting insights
into outmigration behavior. In a recent contribution, Dustmann (2003) shows that a neo-classical
approach based on earnings differentials has sufﬁcient ﬂexibility to explain outmigration. Using a
life-cycle framework and assuming that the marginal utility of consumption is higher in the home
than in the host country, he ﬁnds that migration durations may in fact decrease when earnings in
the host country are high enough, keeping constant earnings in the home country.
A different trend of the literature has highlighted the role of non-pecuniary motives in shaping
outmigration decisions. This literature draws on sociological evidence suggesting that expected
earnings comparisons alone may not be sufﬁcient to adequately characterize outmigration behav-
ior. Among the most frequently cited non-pecuniary beneﬁts for remaining in the host country are
2whether or not the spouse or children of immigrants live in the host country, health and income
satisfaction, perceptions of being socially integrated and ﬁnancial dependance of relatives back in
the native country (Stark, 1998).
In this paper, we specify and estimate the a structural dynamic discrete choice model in which
earnings, work and outmigration are jointly determined. In our model, forward looking im-
migrants make sequential decisions on work and outmigration behavior in order to maximize
expected discounted lifetime utility. Most existing life-cycle theories of outmigration introduce
uncertainty about economic outcomes in such a way that migration durations result from an opti-
mization process where immigrants simultaneously choose once and for all their duration of stay
in the host country before migrating to a new region. Pessino (1991) relaxes this assumption and
develops a model where an immigrant’s uncertainty about his labor market prospects dissipates
after having actually migrated, a feature shown to be sufﬁcient to cause outmigration. The idea
that uncertainty is removed upon arrival is intuitively appealing but it is difﬁcult to conceive that
all uncertainty disappears upon an immigrant’s arrival in the host country, if only because im-
migrants in western countries constitute a group more prone to occupy temporary and unstable
jobs. Our model distinguishes itself by allowing for uncertainty about future work and earnings
in both the host and home country all through an immigrant’s stay in a foreign country. An impor-
tant consequence of this is that immigrants in our model can continuously revise their migration
duration in the host country as their information set is updated through time. Another attrac-
tive feature of our model is that we incorporate this extra level of uncertainty while embedding
both economic and sociological motives for outmigration in a common framework. Speciﬁcally,
we allow outmigration to depend on different marginal utilities of consumption and labor mar-
ket earnings in the host and home country, remittances, and several other non-pecuniary beneﬁts
including feelings of social integration, income satisfaction, age at immigration and whether the
spouse lives in the host country or not. Given these elements are imbedded in our model, we can
directly test the validity of some of the motives put forward to explain outmigration.
An additional contribution of our approach is that both the migration duration and the work
decisions are endogenous variables. This generalization has interesting implications for outmigra-
tion behavior, as barriers to entry in the host labor market have the potential to lower considerably
welfare, thus making outmigration an attractive option. Cohen and Ecktein (2002) for instance
ﬁnd that improving access to the Israelian labor market gives Russian immigrants higher welfare
gains than increasing their potential labor market earnings. The extent to which lower job market
access is associated with outmigration has recently been addressed in Bellemare (2004) who ﬁnds
that immigrants in Germany leaving the country have a 30% lower probability of working than
immigrants who remained in the host country.
This paper also makes an important methodological contribution to the empirical literature on
outmigration. One of the main obstacles which has prevented the estimation of economic models
3of outmigration is the difﬁculty in obtaining accurate micro-level data on outmigration behavior
(see Dustmann (2000) for a related discussion of this problem). Here, we develop an econometric
framework which (nonparametrically) identiﬁes the conditional outmigration probability in our
sample without having to actually observe actual outmigration decisions. This approach draws
on previous work (Bellemare, 2004) and is based on using sample attrition as a baseline proxy
variable for outmigration and incorporating in the model the probability that sample attrition is
confounded for outmigration, a probability which is parameterized and estimated. We show that
this approach is sufﬁcient to recover consistent estimates of our structural parameters.
The model is estimated using data drawn from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP)
Public use ﬁle. The estimated model is shown to ﬁt the data well. Immigrants are found to have a
time horizon slightly greater than 20 years. The outmigration rate is predicted to be approximately
3% per year and matches well stylized facts, suggesting that the model successfully separates
outmigration based attrition from other forms of attrition. Several explanations of existing life-
cycle models appear to be consistent with our data. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that returning money
back to the native country, satisfaction with income, feelings of social integration and earnings
differentials have a signiﬁcant impact on outmigration decisions. Simulation results show that
for some immigrants, predicted migration durations are very sensitive to both changes in returns
and in the stock of human capital. Predicted migration durations are found to be very sensitive to
whether a myopic rather than a forward-looking model is used.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the life-cycle model. Section
3 discusses the approach used to estimate the structural model. Section 4 presents the data used
in the paper and sketches the state of immigration in Germany and the historical policies that
have been implemented to favor and curb immigration ﬂows. Section 5 discusses the results and
presents simulations to asses both the performance and the life-cycle implications of the model.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Economic model
We have a measure of N immigrants in period t =1, where immigrant i remains in the panel
for Ti periods The control variables (d1
it,d2
it,d3
it) summarize the decisions taken in each period.
An immigrant can choose to work in Germany (d1
it = 1), not work but stay in Germany (d2
it =
1) or outmigrate (d3
it = 1). When an immigrant works and stays in Germany, he enjoys non-
pecuniary direct (dis)utility d1
it and utility derived from his consumption cit. The marginal utility
of consumption in Germany is denoted by qG. When he does not work, the immigrant receives
non-pecuniary direct utility d2
it, which reﬂects utility derived from leisure. Finally, we assume
that an immigrant who leaves the country ﬁnds work and receives direct (dis)utility d3
it and utility
from consumption, where the marginal utility of consumption in his home country is denoted by
4qN.1 Each decision is mutually exclusive (i.e. d1
it + d2
it + d3
it = 1). We assume that outmigration
is irreversible which implies that the control variable d3
it acts as a stopping rule.2 Every decision
is made at the beginning of the period and is based on the information set Wit in period t. An

































E denotes the expectation taken over the joint distribution of the stochastic future state variables
(see below) and b 2 [0,1] is the subjective discount factor. Equation (1) is maximized subject to
the immigrant’s budget constraint, which is assumed to be satisﬁed in each period, and is given
by






it is the log earnings of immigrants in Germany, while wN
it denotes their log earnings in
the home country.3 Equation (2) implies that immigrants do not save, an admittedly restrictive
assumption in light of recent theoretical and empirical models of asset accumulation and return
migration (e.g. Dustmann and Kirchkamp, 2002). One of the reasons we maintain this assumption
is that information on savings was available mid-way through our observation window. Another
reason is relaxing this assumption requires that we deal with a considerable expansion of the
choice set and the state space which, given the associated computational burden, is beyond the
scope of this paper. Nevertheless, as will be shown below, rather than being linked through sav-
ings, future consumption depends on current period choices as immigrants who remain in the
host country and/or work increase their levels of human capital, thus affecting their future earn-
ings and consumption levels. The functions d1
it, d2
it and d3
it are allowed to depend on individual
1In this paper, we treat return migration and outmigration as equivalent concepts since most of the outmigration
movements are believed to be return movements. However, the model above does not rule out other departure desti-
nations.
2In our data, reversible outmigration is negligible (Pannenberg, 1998). In other countries however, the assumption of
non reversible outmigration is not likely to be satisﬁed. Jasso and Rosenzweig (1990) ﬁnd that reversible outmigration
of Mexican immigrants living in the United States is particularly important.
3Outmigration costs do not enter the budget constraint associated with outmigration, reﬂecting the fact that the
German federal government reimbursed outmigration costs from 1984 to 1992 (see Section 4 for details). We do not
model the regime change after 1992.
5characteristics
d1
it = a10 + a11Sendcashit¡1 + a12Incomesait¡1 + a13Intfeelit¡1 (3)
+a14Educit¡1 + a15Experit¡1 + a16Exper2






it = a30 + a31Sendcashit¡1 + a32Incomesait¡1 + a33Intfeelit¡1 (4)
+a34Ageatimi + a35Wifeingeit¡1 + #3
it
Sendcash is a binary indicator taking a value of 1 if the immigrant returns money to the host coun-
try, Ageatim denotes the age at arrival in Germany, Intfeel captures the subjective perception of
beingintegrated in the society, andWifeinge isa binary indicator takinga value of 1 when thewife
of the immigrant lives in Germany. Incomesa denotes reported satisfaction with income earned
in Germany. This is included in both the work and the outmigration non-pecuniary beneﬁts to
capture the additional utility accruing to ﬁnancial security which is not due to pure earnings con-
sumption. Educ corresponds to the total number of years of education, Exper denotes the total








consists of time speciﬁc shocks to utility. In order to deal with
the fact that the individual characteristics of immigrants who drop out of the panel in period t are
not observed, all observable time varying individual characteristics enter as lags. Working with
predetermined variables also avoids having to deal with potential simultaneity between some of
the background characteristics and the choice process.
The speciﬁcation of the earnings equation in Germany follows those used in the literature on
economic assimilation of immigrants (Borjas, 1999)
wG
it = j0 + j1Educit¡1 + j2Gspeakit¡1 + j3Unempit (5)
+j4Experit¡1 + j5Exper2
it¡1 + j6Ysmit¡1 + hG
it
Earnings depend on education, years of labor market experience, years since immigration, speak-
ing ﬂuency of immigrants in German Gspeak, and on the unemployment rate in the province of
residence Unemp. The returns to human capital and the province speciﬁc localization are captured
by the j parameters while hG
it captures shocks to earnings.
It is important to highlight that the level of education, the years of labor market experience
and the number of years since migration affect the utility of working in the host country via two
channels–one through a direct effect on d1
it keeping earnings ﬁxed, and one via an indirect effect on
the utility of consumption qGwG
it due to changes in earnings wG
it. The signs of the direct and indi-
rect effects which follow from changing either of these variables need not be the same. Keeping
earnings ﬁxed, higher educated individuals may have relatively greater disutility from working
in the host country if they take on jobs associated with greater responsibilities. The direct and
indirect effects of Exper and Ysm can also have similar opposing effects on the overall utility of
6each alternative, a feature which can partly account for retirement from the labor force in the later
part of the life-cycle. This will be the case if, as it typically is the case, labor market earnings proﬁle
level off at high levels of labor market experience, which implies that working an extra year in the
host labor market will have a very small effect on utility via changes in consumption. Immigrant
will then have an incentive to retire from the labor force if they suffer greater direct disutility from
working an additional year in the host country, keeping earnings constant.
The earnings in the home country are determined by
(6) wN
it = g0 + g1Educit¡1 + g2Experit¡1 + g3Exper2
it¡1 + hN
it
where the g parameters capture the returns to human capital and hN
it is an unobserved stochastic
shock.











The two endogenous state variables, Experit¡1 and Ysmit¡1, have the following laws of motion:
Experit¡1 = Experit¡2 + d1
it¡1 and Ysmit¡1 = Ysmit¡2 + Max[d1
it¡1,d2




i0 = 0. All other variables are assumed to be exogenous which implicitly assumes
that immigrants are in some sense myopic and cannot foresee any updating of their characteristics
over time.
3 Estimation procedure
Given some distributional assumptions on the stochastic parts of the model, it is in principle
straightforward to test different life-cycle hypothesis by estimating several speciﬁcations, each
obtained by maximizing the complete likelihood function which combines the choice and earn-
ings data in a single step. Given the numerical burden of estimating a dynamic programming
model, this direct approach is computationally demanding. In this paper, we use the three step
estimation strategy proposed by van der Klaauw (1996). In the ﬁrst step, a reduced form dynamic
programming model is estimated using the choice data. The parameter estimates of the ﬁrst step
are then used to estimate the parameters of the wage equation for Germany, controlling for sam-
ple selection due to the decision to work and to remain in the home country. In the third step, a
Minimum Distance Estimator (MDE) is used to recover the structural parameters of the economic
model. Wediscussinmoredetaileachstep, startingwiththereducedformdynamicprogramming
model.











into a set Uit containing all state variables
assumed to be observed by the econometrician. When incorporating the earnings equations (5)
and (6) in the budget constraint (2), and the budget constraint in the objective function (1), we can
7express the contemporary utility of choosing each alternative through reduced form equations
U1 (Uit) + e1
it = a10 + a11Sendcashit¡1 + a12Incomesait¡1 + a13Intfeelit¡1
+a14Educit¡1 + a15Experit¡1 + a16Exper2
it¡1 + a17Ysmit¡1
+qG fj0 + j1Educit¡1 + j2Gspeakit¡1 + j3Unempit¡1 + j4Experit¡1
+j5Exper2





= l10 + l11Sendcashit¡1 + l12Incomesait¡1 + l13Intfeelit¡1
+l14Educit¡1 + l15Gspeakit¡1 + l16Unempit
+l17Experit¡1 + l18Exper2
it¡1 + l19Ysmit¡1 + e1
it
U2 (Uit) + e2
it = e2
it
U3 (Uit) + e3
it = a30 + a31Sendcashit¡1 + a32Incomesait¡1 + a33Intfeelit¡1 + a34Ageatimi
+a35Wifeingeit¡1 + qN
n





= l30 + l31Sendcashit¡1 + l32Incomesait¡1 + l33Intfeelit¡1 + l34Ageatimi
+l35Wifeingeit¡1 + l36Educit¡1 + l37Experit¡1 + l38Exper2
it¡1 + e3
it
where the vector l = [l10,l11,...l38]
0 will be used to denote the reduced form parameters. We












are have conditional mean zero and are independently distributed over time and individuals and
follow an extreme-value type I distribution.
The model presented above does not admit an analytical solution. Using the terminal condi-
tions and the distributional assumptions on the stochastic components of the model, it is possible
to solve numerically for the set of optimal decisions using backward induction for a given set
of reduced form parameters l and b. Using Bellman’s principle of optimality (Bellman, 1957),
the solution of (1) can be decomposed as the solution of T separate problems where, for each

































t (Uit) are value functions associated with choice j = 1,2,3. The value functions associated
with the ﬁrst two decisions (j = 1,2) given the information at time t is given by
(8) V
j









8where EMax represents the expected value of the maximal future value function, where expecta-







contained in the information set Wit+1. Finally,
the outmigration decision acts as a terminal control variable whose associated value function has
the following simple form
V3
















bj¡(t+1) (l30 + l31Sendcashit¡1 + l32Incomesait¡1 + l33Intfeelit¡1 + l34Ageatimi
+l35Wifeingeit¡1 + l36Educi + l37Experit¡1 + l38Exper2
it¡1 + x
¢
where x is Euler’s constant. In the ﬁnite horizon case, the solution of the value functions (8) are
computed by backward recursion starting in the terminal period T. At every time period t, the
goal is to compute V
j
t (Uit) for every value of Uit that could enter the choice probabilities at time t
or are needed during the recursion in equation (8) to compute the choice-speciﬁc value functions
in the periods t¡1,t¡2,...,1.4 The primary task is evaluating the EMax functions in equation (8).
Given our distributional assumptions, the expected value functions turn out to have a convenient





















Given we have solved the value function problem for each individual and each time period in
our sample for a given set of parameter values, it is straightforward to compute the likelihood
function. Each immigrant i is observed for Ti time periods. In each time period, we observe for








periods is denoted by di = [di (t),...,di (Ti)]. The sample likelihood function of the reduced form









Pr[di (Ti)jdi (Ti ¡ 1),...,di (2),di (1)]¢¢¢Pr[di (2)jdi (1)]Pr[di (1)]
From equation (9) we see that the choice probability at time Ti depends on all past choices of
the individual, a fact which is reﬂected through the information set Uit. Given that the Bellman
4As is well known, solving the dynamic programming problem is computationally demanding. Optimizing the
likelihood function presented below took more than one month on a 2.66 GHz pentium 4 processor. On the other hand,
maximization of the likelihood function assuming immigrants are myopic agents took less than a minute.
9equations have been solved for a given set of parameter values, and given the decision rule (7),











t (Uit) + e
j
it > Vl
t (Uit) + el
it; for all l 6= j
´






t (Uit) + e
j
it > Vl
t (Uit) + el


























So far, we have assumed that d3
it was perfectly observed. However, in most data sets, outmi-
gration is either not observed or badly measured. What is usually perfectly observed is whether
an immigrant drops out of the panel, which is denoted here by the indicator d3o
it which takes a
value of 1 when the immigrant drops out of the panel and 0 otherwise. One approach is simply
to use d3o
it as a proxy for d3
it. However, measurement error of a discrete left hand side variable
can lead to severely biased parameters and variance estimates in non-linear models (see Bound,
Brown and Mathiowetz (2001) for a survey of this literature). Because the dynamic programming
model used in this paper is highly non-linear, the obvious measurement error in d3o
it is a non-trivial
issue. We deal with the partial observability of outmigration in our data by extending the method
proposed in Bellemare (2004). The approach rests on the idea that an immigrant who outmigrates
necessarily leaves the panel, which suggests that panel attrition carries some information on out-
migration behavior. To extract the information on outmigration contained in panel attrition, we




















































represents the probability of observing an immigrant leaving
the panel given that he remained in Germany, either working or not.5 The last equality in (10)






= 1 whereby an immigrant who outmigrates will
5This is closely related to the class of discrete choice models proposed by Hausman, Abrevaya and Scott-Morton
(1998), where the endogenous discrete outcome is either misclassiﬁed or misreported. Our approach differs from this
literature as only one of the realizations of the binary outcome is partly observed.
10leave the panel with probability 1. The parameter a3,12 can be directly incorporated in the likeli-










The procedure used above to identify the conditional outmigration probability is motivated
on the basis that the information on outmigration behavior contained in panel attrition can be





is equal to a3,12 for the subgroup
of immigrants with characteristics tit such that Pr
¡
d3
it = 1jUit = tit
¢
= 0, indicating that the value
of a3,12 is nonparametrically identiﬁed from the sample of immigrants with observable character-
istics such that their outmigration probability is close to zero. 6 If the model is well speciﬁed, the
assumption that there exists a subgroup of immigrants with observable characteristics yielding an
outmigration probability close to zero can be checked by computing the share of predicted sample
outmigration probabilities which are close to zero. Apart from providing us with a sound moti-
vation to deal with the partial observability of outmigration related attrition, the nonparametric
nature of this identiﬁcation result suggests that model estimates should not depend heavily on
our parametric assumptions.
The reduced form estimates of the dynamic programming model are used to estimate the earn-
ings equation (5) correcting for selectivity due to work and attrition. Dubin and McFadden (1984)









is linear in #1
it,#2
it and #3
it, the conditional expected earnings of immi-




























































The parameters of this equation can be consistently estimated using OLS provided we can ob-
tain consistent estimates of the choice probabilities which enter the selection terms (see van der
















from the reduced form dynamic programming model.
Finally, in the third stage, given consistent estimates of
h
b b,b a3,12,b l0, b j0, b t2, b t3
i0
´ b p, consistent
6It is possible to allow the attrition parameter a3,12 to depend on observable individual characteristics. Using the
same data set, Bellemare (2004) ﬁnds little variation in the attrition probability across individuals with different char-
acteristics. In light of this result and the numerical complexity of the present model, we did not attempt to estimate
attrition probabilities conditional on observable characteristics.
11estimates of the structural parameters y are obtained using a minimum distance estimator (Cham-
berlain, 1984). We deﬁne the MDE as
min
y
(b p ¡ g(y))
0 C¡1 (b p ¡ g(y))
where the function g imposes the restrictions speciﬁed by the structural model on the reduced
form parameter estimates.7 C denotes the covariance matrix of b p which can be computed using
the estimated covariance matrices and the outer-product of the scores from the estimates of the
ﬁrst two steps (see van der Klaauw, 1996). The resulting estimate of y, b y




b y ¡ y0






where H = ¶g(y)/¶y0 and y0 is the true value of y.
We now brieﬂy discuss identiﬁcation of the structural parameters. As is well known, the dis-
count factor b is identiﬁed from the assumption that time preferences are additive. The parame-
ters of the earnings equation in the host country are identiﬁed from the observable earnings data.
Given these and the fact that because the utility of leisure is normalized to zero, reduced form l
parameters are identiﬁed from the choice data, thus qG is identiﬁed from the exclusion of Gspeakit
andUnempit fromthedirectutilityofworking. Aswillbeshown, theserestrictionsarenotrejected
at usual conﬁdence levels. Moreover, the identiﬁcation of the reduced form l parameters also im-
plies that fa31,a32,a33,a34,a35g are identiﬁed. Identiﬁcation of the parameters of the earnings
function in the home country (6) would require data on immigrant earnings upon their return.
Because our data does not contain this information (see section 4), we cannot separately iden-





nevertheless reveals some information on the coefﬁcients of the earnings equation of wN
it . More
precisely, all four qNg parameters are non-zero if and only if qN and the parameter g are separately
non-zero. Under the assumption that qN 6= 0, the signs of the g parameters as well as ratios of gj
are identiﬁed.
Given the parameters which are identiﬁed, some of the existing outmigration theories can
be tested in a straightforward way. The neo-classical assumption that outmigration decisions
are entirely based on earnings differentials can be evaluated by testing whether the parameters
determining the non-pecuniary beneﬁts in equations (3) and (4) are jointly equal to zero. The
hypothesis that immigrants are myopic decision makers can be evaluated by testing whether the
discount factor b is equal to zero, while each non-pecuniary motive can be evaluated by testing
the signiﬁcance of the corresponding parameters of the direct utility functions d1
it and d3
it.
7Examples of restrictions are l10 = a10 + qGj0 and l13 = qGj2.
124 Data
The data used in this paper is extracted from the immigrant sample of the public use ﬁle of the
GSOEP and covers the 1985-1999 period. The sample consists of an oversample of immigrants
living in West-Germany coming from countries which had signed a bilateral migration agreement
with Germany in the 1950s and 1960s namely Greece, Italy, Spain, Turkey and Yugoslavia8. Data
on speaking ﬂuency, feelings of being socially integrated, intended length of stay and remittances
where given in consecutive waves from 1984 until 1987. Starting in 1987, this information was
gathered every other year. In order to keep a constant time interval between observations, we
have chosen to keep the 8 waves of the panel where detailed information on immigrants was
available, each spanned by one year, starting in 1985 and ending in 1999. We restrict our attention
to males between 18-64 years of age during the 1985 and 1999 period. Excluded from the sample
are individuals who died during the observation period and individuals who gave incomplete
information on any single variable entering the empirical model in any of the 8 waves. This leaves
us with a sample of 732 immigrants starting in 1985.
Figure 1 presents the proportions of immigrants in the sample which were working, not work-
ing or left the panel in each wave from 1987 to 1999.9 Changes over time can be broken down to
three sub-periods. The 1987 to 1991 period saw the percentage of working immigrants increase
from 68% in 1987 to 73% in 1991. At the same time, the proportion of non-working immigrants
increased from 12% in 1987 to 16% in 1991. The movements in employment and unemployment
were matched by a general decline in the attrition rates, from 20% in 1987 to just over 10% in 1991.
The period from 1991 to 1995 is characterized by the general economic downturn which followed
reuniﬁcation. The percentage of the immigrant population working declined steadily to 58% in
1995 while the proportion of non-workers and the proportion of who left the panel increased re-
spectively by 8 and 6 percentage points. In the ﬁnal sub-period (1995-1999), the proportion of
working immigrants slightly increased to 63% in 1997 before declining to 58% in 1999, while the
proportion of non-working immigrants increased to 26% in 1997 before falling to 22% in 1999. As
a result, the attrition rate decreased in 1997 before increasing in 1999.
Table 1 gives variable descriptions and summary statistics for the 1985 and 1999 waves. We
see that the average age of immigrants was 39.8 years in 1985 and 44.5 years in 1999, a ﬁve year
increase over a 14 year interval which indicates that the relatively older immigrants left the panel.
The average number of years of labor market experience increased by 3.3 years over the 14 year
period, which is consistent with the fact that the proportion of working immigrants fell in the
1990’s.
Most immigrants migrated to Germany early in their productive lives, a fact reﬂected by an
average age at immigration of nearly 24 years, a ﬁgure consistent through out the observation
8Immigrants of Portuguese nationality are not included in the panel.
9The 1985 choice data is omitted from the ﬁgure as no attrition took place by construction.
13period, indicating that most immigrants were in the age to autonomously decide to move to Ger-
many. The average year of immigration in our data was 1969 in the 1985 wave, but increased to
1979 in the 1999 wave, indicating that the earlier cohorts are most susceptible to have dropped
out of the panel. As the earlier cohorts contain the migrants with the higher number of years
since migration in 1985, it is not surprising to see that average years since immigration increases
relatively less than the 14 year time span, passing from 15.75 in 1985 to 19.63 in 1999. Reported
feelings on integration in the German society and reported speaking ﬂuency improved over time
while health satisfaction deteriorated, the latter likely capturing an aging effect. Finally, 73% of
immigrants reported having a spouse living outside Germany in 1985 while as little as 1% still do
so in 1999. This severe drop can be interpreted in two different ways. First, spouses may have
eventually migrated to Germany during the time period. Second, it might be that immigrants
whose spouse was living abroad were more likely to outmigrate.
5 Estimation results for the structural model
The model was estimated by setting the time horizon, T, at 65 years of age. In this section, we will
comparetwospeciﬁcations, amyopic (static)model whichsets b equalto 0, anda forward-looking
(dynamic) model where b is estimated. In the later case, b converged to an estimated value of
0.655, which is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Given a two year span between each period,
this implies a yearly discount factor of 0.809, indicating that immigrants are reasonably forward
looking decision makers. Accordingly, we will focus our analysis of the results using the forward
looking speciﬁcation and make references to the myopic model when necessary.
Structural estimates and asymptotic standard errors of the myopic and forward-looking mod-
els are presented in Table 2.10 All parameter estimates are fairly similar across both models. Start-
ing with the estimates of the earnings equation in Germany, we ﬁnd the usual positive effects
of the number of years of education and labor market experience, and the concave relationship
between earnings and labor market experience in both the myopic and forward-looking models.
Furthermore, increases in the number of years since migration and improvements in the speaking
ﬂuency of immigrants have a positive and signiﬁcant effect on labor market earnings. Living in
provinces of Germany with relatively higher unemployment rates has a small but signiﬁcant neg-
ative inﬂuence on earnings of immigrants, reﬂecting the presence of labor market externalities.
Immigrant earnings are found to increase by 1.1% with every extra year spent in the host country,
which suggest that economic assimilation in the sense of LaLonde and Topel (1992) is taking place.
The impact on earnings of self-selection into work and staying in the host country can be
gauged by comparing the slope coefﬁcients of the dynamic structural model which accounts for
both selection effects, to those of the OLS estimator. The last two columns of Table 2 present OLS
10The corresponding estimates of the reduced form choice and earnings parameters are presented in Table 5 in the
appendix.
14estimates of the earnings equation. Apart from the effect of the unemployment rate on the ex-
pected earnings which becomes insigniﬁcant, all coefﬁcients have the same magnitude and levels
of signiﬁcance across both speciﬁcations, suggesting little self-selection bias of the earnings equa-
tion coefﬁcients.
We now turn to the estimates of the utility function parameters in Table 2. We ﬁnd the mar-
ginal utility of consumption is positive and signiﬁcant, indicating that earnings differential play a
signiﬁcant impact on the utility of working and staying in Germany. Neo-classical models of out-
migration assume that outmigration is exclusively driven by earnings differentials between the
host and home country. Hence, the relevant null hypothesis to test is whether all non-pecuniary
rewards entering d1
it and d3
it are jointly equal to zero. Our empirical results show that this null
hypothesis is strongly rejected. Increased satisfaction with income, higher feelings of being inte-
grated in Germany and sending money back to the native country all signiﬁcantly increase the
utility of working in Germany relative to not working but remaining in Germany. Sending money
back to the native country also has a signiﬁcant and positive effect on the utility of outmigration,
relative to not working. Because a12 > a32, returning money back to the native country has a nega-
tive net effect on outmigration in the myopic model. Satisfaction with income is found not to affect
d3
it, the utility of outmigration relative to not working in the host country. Given that higher satis-
faction with income was shown to lead to increases in the utility of working in the host country,
it is clear that this will lead to a lower outmigration probability. Finally, psychic costs of working
were captured by including education, labor market experience and years since migration in the
direct utility of working. We ﬁnd that keeping earnings constant, the disutility from work in the
host country increases with the number of years of education, which can be explained by the fact
that individuals with higher levels of education tend to take jobs with more responsibilities, rais-
ing their psychic costs of working. Similarly, we ﬁnd that the psychic costs quickly increase with
the number of years of labor market experience. Because the marginal earnings gain from an extra
year of labor market experience is small, while psychic costs are high, at high values of labor mar-
ket experience, we expect that immigrants with relatively higher migration and work experience
retire progressively from the labor force. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that the disutility from working
in the host country increases with the migration duration. Because the increase in earnings which
accrues to one extra year in the host country are small, this suggests that the outmigration proba-
bility may in fact increase as the number of years since immigration increase. Some other results
of interest are that higher age at immigration is associated with a higher utility of outmigrating,
which could reﬂect that older migrants have less time to integrate and establish solid roots and
networks in Germany.
Turning now to parameter estimates of the earnings equation in the home country, it is im-
portant to recall that without observations on the earnings of outmigrants in the home country,
the returns to human capital in the home country are not separately identiﬁed from qN , nor are
15they separately identiﬁed from direct effects on utility d3
it such as those found to affect the utility
of working in Germany. However, under the realistic assumption that qN is positive11 and the
(a priori strong) assumption that the level of education and the number of years of labor market
experience in the host country do not affect the direct utility of outmigration other than through
earnings, the signs of g1,g2 and g3 are identiﬁed. If both assumptions hold jointly, we expect
that education enters positively (g1 > 0), while experience enters with the usual concave relation-
ship (g2 > 0,g3 < 0). If keeping earnings constant individuals with higher levels of education
or a higher number of years of labor market experience also suffer greater disutility from outmi-
grating, then estimated signs of the parameters may be overturned. We ﬁnd that education has
a familiar positive and statistically signiﬁcant effect on outmigration, indicating that more edu-
cated immigrants have higher utility from outmigrating relative to not working but remaining in
the host country. However, contrary to what one would expect from a typical tenure proﬁle, the
relationship between the number of years of labor market experience and outmigration utility is
convex rather than concave. Starting from no labor market experience, the utility of outmigra-
tion is predicted to rapidly decrease as labor market experience increases, reaching a minimum
at 25.43 years of labor market experience. For an immigrant with labor market experience higher
than 25.43 years, the utility of outmigration progressively increases as years of labor market ex-
perience are accumulated. Because we can assume that qN > b qG = 4.906 (see footnote ), we
rule out the possibility that the convex pattern be explained by a negative value of qN. It seems
more probable that the convex pattern reﬂects unidentiﬁed psychic costs/gains associated with
outmigration similar to those found affecting the direct utility of working in the host country.
Our inferences on outmigration behavior rely on an identiﬁcation strategy which allowed us
to extract information on outmigration behavior from sample attrition by introducing in the like-
lihood function the parameter a3,12 which accounts for the possibility that part of the overall at-
trition is not related to outmigration. The estimated value of a3,12 is 0.102, which represents the
probability of attrition which is not due to outmigration. The difference between the overall attri-
tion rate, of the level of 17% per two years, and a3,12, suggests an average outmigration rate of 6%
per two years, or 3% per year, remarkably close of the corresponding value reported in Bellemare
(2003). The robustness of this value to whether we estimate a reduced form or a structural model,
or whether we estimate a structural myopic model or a forward-looking model, is an indirect indi-
cation that nonparametric identiﬁcation of this quantity holds. This belief is further reinforced by
the simulation evidence presented below which indicates that the majority of immigrants in our
sample are predicted to have an outmigration probability close to 0, satisfying one of the essential
requirements for nonparametric identiﬁcation of a3,12. To show that this estimated value matches
well stylized facts, we compare the average attrition rate in our sample of immigrants with that
of a representative sample of native Germans. Table 3 is taken from Bellemare (2003) and presents
11The literature (see e.g. Djajic and Milbourne, 1988; Stark, 1998) typically assumes that qN > qG. Given our esti-
mated value of qG is 4.906 (see table 2), it follows that qN > 0 will hold.
16the attrition rates per wave for both immigrants and native German samples. Averaging over the
sample period, we ﬁnd that the attrition rate in the sample of Germans is 11.6% (per two years)
compared to 17.2% in the immigrant sample. If the proportion of immigrants leaving the panel but
remaining in Germany is of the same magnitude to that of Germans, than the difference between
attrition rates would represent an average outmigration rate of 3% as implied by our model. We
donothavedirectinformationindicatingthatimmigrantshavethesamenormalattritionratethan
natives. However, apart from outmigration and deaths, panel attrition occurs either because in-
dividuals decide to stop participating in the survey project, or individuals move within Germany
and cannot be tracked by the survey institution. Clark and Drever (2001) ﬁnd that immigrants
in the GSOEP sample are not more likely to move within Germany than natives while Pischke
and Velling (1997) ﬁnd that immigrants in the western parts of Germany live in regions with a
high concentration of ethnic minorities. Both results imply that, if anything, immigrants are easier
to track than natives; hence the proportion of immigrants dropping out and staying in Germany
should be of similar magnitude to that of Germans and suggests that a3,12 should be no greater
than 11.6%, which is what we ﬁnd in the data.
Before illustrating the implications of these estimates in terms of individual differences in life-
cycle patterns of outmigration, we ﬁrst present evidence that the model explains our data reason-
ably well. We do so by simulating for each individual 1000 choice sequences from the ﬁrst period
to each individual’s ﬁnal observation period. Yearly predicted proportions for each of our three
decisions were then obtained by averaging simulated choices in each period over all draws and
all individuals. The top panel of Figure 2 shows the corresponding simulated (S) and real (R)
frequencies of the choice to work in Germany along with the choice to stay in Germany without
working. We see that our model ﬁts the data well over our time horizon. Speciﬁcally, the model is
able to capture both the decline in the work participation and the associated rise in the proportions
of non-workers which occurred after 1991. The bottom panel of Figure 2 shows the simulated and
real attrition rates together with the predicted outmigrated rate for each wave. Our model slightly
under predicts attrition in 1987 and 1989 but ﬁts the data well after that. The under prediction
at the start of the sample period is consistent with the fact that attrition rates for native Germans
were also higher in the ﬁrst waves of the panel (see table 3), a fact which can be traced back to
the early survey methodology (Pannenberg, 1998). Finally, the predicted outmigration rate rises
from 2.5% in 1987 to 3.5% in 1995, at the peak of the economic downturn. Subsequently, the out-
migration rate is predicted to fall slightly from 1995 onwards, a drop which is consistent with the
stabilization of the increase in the proportion of immigrants’ unemployed.
5.1 Implications for life-cycle behavior
The estimates in Table 2 show that both the myopic and forward looking models yield very simi-
larparameterestimates. However, becausechangesinmodelparameterswilladditionallyperturb
17the Emax functions entering the value functions of the forward looking model, and because im-
migrants are found to be forward looking, predicted life-cycle patterns may differ substantially
across both models. In this section, we perform some comparative static exercises to quantify
these differences. As the outmigration probability of an average sample immigrant is very low,
performing comparative static exercises on a representative immigrant does not induce sufﬁcient
variation in his migration behavior to appreciate the implications of the model. Instead, we take
as a benchmark an immigrant at the margin of moving and staying in Germany. He his deﬁned
as a 30 year old immigrant, who migrated to Germany four years ago, has 10 years of education,
8 years of experience, does not return money to his native country, speaks below average Ger-
man (4 on the scale from 1 to 5), is not married, has a reported satisfaction with income of 3 (on
the scale from 0 to 10), lives in a province with an unemployment rate of 8% and has average
labor market monthly earnings of 1000 DM in 1985. We chose a benchmark of 8 years of expe-
rience in order to be 6 years below the potential number of years of experience.12 In this way,
we model an immigrant who experienced periods of unemployment upon his arrival in the host
country. We simulated predicted migration durations from 1985 onwards by simulating 10000
choice sequences for our marginal immigrant from 1985 to the time he exits the country, using the
parameters reported in Table 2. We then alter successively either one variable or parameter and
compare the new distribution of predicted migration durations to the benchmark case.
Table 4 reports, for both the dynamic and myopic model, predicted total migration durations
(all durations include 4 years since immigration assumed at the start in 1985) averaged over all
simulations. The forward-looking model benchmark predicts an average migration duration of
14.95 years. We simulate a tax relief by permanently increasing the net average monthly labor
market earnings of immigrants by the lump-sum value of 100 DM per month. Our simulations
show that this tax relief increases the migration duration by 65.75% to 24.78 years, a consider-
able increase relative to the amount given. Integration policies aimed at boosting human capital
levels can take different forms. Governments can offer language courses to speed up proﬁciency
of immigrants, or they may offer training which could raise the returns to labor market expe-
rience of immigrants. Both policies are predicted to have sizeable consequences for migration
durations. Increasing speaking ﬂuency from ”Below average” to ”Very good” increases migration
duration by 71.51% to 25.64 years, which reﬂects that immigrants with better speaking ﬂuency
have higher expected earnings. Offering training courses which would raise the returns to labor
market experience by 25% results in average migration durations of 29.83 years, almost twice that
of the benchmark case. Alternatively, governments can reduce the barriers to entry in the host
labor market by offering internships or other programs aimed at increasing an immigrant’s la-
bor market experience. Such a measure is simulated by increasing the number of years of labor
market experience of our marginal immigrant in 1985 by 4 years. We ﬁnd that the migration du-
12In this case, the number of potential years of experience are 30-10 years of education -6 = 14.
18ration increases relatively less than all previous changes, increasing average duration by 34.18%
to just above 20 years. Increasing the satisfaction with labor income from 3 to 6 on the scale has
a surprisingly important impact on the migration durations, which average 30.22 years, 102.14%
higher than the baseline case. Finally, returning money to the native country increases migration
durations by 59.8% to an average of 23.89 years, which is consistent with the predictions of recent
models of remittance behavior of Mesnard (2001).
The results of table 4 focus on the mean of the predicted migration duration distributions. Be-
cause our simulations put an upper bound of 40 years on the possible migration duration, the
comparisons described above may be affected by this censoring. Quantiles of the migration dura-
tion distribution on the other hand are robust to this type of censoring. For this reason, and also
because our empirical model allows sufﬁcient non-linearities with respect to accumulated labor
market experience, it is of interest to investigate how other points of the migration duration dis-
tribution are affected by changes in the economic environment. Figure 3 presents the distribution
of the simulated migration durations for some of the relevant cases discussed in Table 4. Inter-
estingly, the distribution of the migration durations in the benchmark case is split between very
low and very high durations. The migration duration probabilities decline rapidly between 4 and
20 years of stay in the host country. The probability that the migration duration lasts anywhere
between 22 and 32 years is very small. However, we ﬁnd a small increase in the probabilities
of having migrations beyond 32 years, and a 12% probability that our marginal immigrant en-
ters retirement age (after 40 years in the host country) while in Germany. The U-shape pattern of
the migration duration distribution is consistent with parameter estimates of the structural model
discussed earlier. There, we found a U-shape relation between labor market experience and the
utility of outmigration, which implies that both immigrants with the lowest and highest levels of
labor market experience have a higher probability of leaving the country. It is interesting to see
that the main impact of our comparative static exercises is to shift probability mass from the lower
hand of the distribution to the upper hand, wiping out middle durations. The probability that
our marginal immigrant reaches retirement age in Germany increases from 12% in the benchmark
case to a little more than 40% in the case of a permanent tax relief of 100 DM. The effect of other
changes are similar, all leading to substantial increases in the probability of reaching retirement
age in Germany. One exception concerns increasing the number of years of labor market experi-
ence in 1985. We ﬁnd that this lowers low migration durations but increases migration durations
between 16 and 38 years, a change consistent with our parameter estimates which suggested that
immigrants with more years of labor market experience suffer greater disutility from working in
the host country, and lower disutility from outmigration.
The second column of Table 4 reports statistics for the same set of simulations, this time using
the myopic model. The magnitude and directions of the comparative static effects differ enor-
mously between both models. First, we ﬁnd that the predicted average migration duration in the
19benchmark case are substantially lower, with an average duration of 6.19 years. This is consistent
with the fact that myopic immigrants do not discount future utility changes as their economic
position improves. Accordingly, we ﬁnd that a tax relief of 100 DM increases the average migra-
tion duration relative by 11.78% relative to the benchmark case, a little less than an extra year.
Improvements in speaking ﬂuency and returns to labor market experience have the same posi-
tive effect on migration duration than in the forward looking model but, again, of much smaller
magnitude (raising migration durations by 12.92% and 15.99% respectively). The most surpris-
ing differences between the forward-looking model and the myopic model concerns the effect of
increasing immigrant satisfaction with income and the effect of returning money to the native
country. While increasing satisfaction with income doubled the average migration duration in the
forward-looking model, it has a very small effect on the migration durations in the myopic model.
Similarly, while returning money increased migration durations by 59.79% in the forward-looking
model, they are found to increase migration durations in the myopic model by only 2.56%. The
shape of the predicted migration durations in the myopic model is also very different from those
of the forward-looking model. Figure 4 presents the simulated migration duration distributions
for the myopic model. The benchmark distribution is heavily skewed to the left, and the probabil-
ity of staying in Germany for longer than 26 years is in all practical sense zero. All other graphs
have a similar shape and make clear that the myopic model predicts that our marginal immigrant
would never enter retirement age in the host country, a clear distinction with the forward looking
model.
6 Conclusions
This paper is a ﬁrst attempt to estimate a structural dynamic model of work and outmigration de-
cisions that immigrants make over their life-cycle. The optimization problem of immigrants has
the structure of a dynamic programming problem, which can be solved recursively by backward
induction. The model in this paper distinguishes itself from the existing literature by allowing
immigrants to progressively revise their migration duration decisions during the migration pe-
riod. Despite this difference, the model is general enough to incorporate several determinants of
outmigration put forward in the existing literature, namely differences in earnings and marginal
utilities of consumption between the home and host country, returning money back to the native
country, feelings of social integration and satisfaction with income. The estimates of the model
are used to predict changes in the life-cycle patterns of outmigration decisions due to changes
in feelings of being integrated in the host country, income satisfaction, labor taxes, and returns
to labor market experience. We estimate the model using the immigrant sample of the GSOEP,
which contains a rich amount of information on the social and economic well being of immigrants
during the 1985-1999 period. The model was shown to ﬁt the data reasonably well.
Our ﬁndings conﬁrm the hypothesis recently put forward in the literature that outmigration
20is not entirely driven by earnings differentials. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that immigrants who feel
integrated in the German society, those who are satisﬁed with their income, and those who re-
turn money to their native country are less likely to outmigrate. The results of this paper also
highlighted the importance of incorporating the work decision along with the migration duration
decision of immigrants, a feature previously ignored in the outmigration literature. We found that
both immigrants with relatively low and high labor market experience have a greater overall util-
ity of outmigration, which suggests a U shape relation between labor market experience and the
overall utility to outmigrate. The decrease in overall outmigration utility starting from low levels
of experience is consistent with increasing psychic costs associated with outmigration. The convex
increase in overall outmigration utility predicted to occur beyond 25 years of labor market experi-
ence is consistent with progressively lower psychic costs of outmigration and diminishing returns
to labor market experience in the host country. These results are interesting given that most of
the outmigration literature has analyzed outmigration within an earnings differential paradigm
which orients policy recommendations towards measures aimed at inﬂuencing the earnings dif-
ferential between the host and home country. Clearly our results do not rule out the important
role played by labor market earnings in determining migration durations. However, they do indi-
cate that for some immigrants, the shape of the migration duration distribution is determined by
past work decisions, indicating that much can be gained from an analysis in which work decisions
are endogenously determined. Moreover, the foregoing analysis indicates that policies aimed at
improving access of immigrants to the host labor market upon their arrival may also play an im-
portant role in determining migration durations.
The bimodal shape of the migration duration distribution of newly arrived immigrants was
found to be robust to realistic changes in model parameters. Our simulation results indicate that
changes in the economic environment have strong repercussions on migration durations of im-
migrants at the margin between staying in Germany and leaving, suggesting that small policy
changes may lead these immigrants to substantially revise their intended migration duration.
Because immigrants in our sample discount substantially the future, the impact of several pol-
icy changes on predicted migration durations based on a forward looking model were shown to
be much more sensitive to changes in the economic environment as opposed to a purely static,
myopic model. Moreover, the predicted migration duration distribution in the myopic model is
unimodal, suggesting that the same immigrants would never establish themselves permanently
in the host country, a feature in sharp contrast with the predictions of the forward-looking model.
These results illustrate the need for a careful evaluation of immigrant subjective discount rates
when discussing the impact of policy changes.
Finally, this paper has shown that the approach used to separate outmigration from attrition
performs well in the structural setting developed in this paper. Estimates of the probability of
confounding immigrants who leave the panel but remain in the host country with outmigrants
21were found to be robust to our stochastic environment and match well stylized facts, an indication
that they are relatively well identiﬁed. As several panel data sets follow immigrants over time but
very few possess information on micro-level outmigration decisions, we hope that this paper is a




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Parameter Variable Estimate SE Estimate SE
Utility of working in Germany
a10 Constant -36.176 9.709*** -38.640 7.923***
a11 Sendcash 1.041 0.111*** 1.089 0.119***
a12 Incomesa 0.441 0.022*** 0.449 0.023***
a13 Intfeel 0.186 0.042*** 0.211 0.043***
a14 Educ /10 -1.323 0.538** -1.254 0.394***
a15 Exper /10 0.594 0.484 0.599 0.452
a16 Exper2 /1000 -1.911 0.888** -1.766 0.802**
a17 Ysm / 10 -0.889 0.196*** -0.949 0.161***
qG Marg. utility cons. 4.624 1.344*** 4.906 1.086***
Utility of outmigrating
a30 + qHg0 Constant -4.229 1.712** -3.900 1.961**
a31 Sendcash 0.965 0.370** 0.784 0.324**
a32 Incomesa 0.023 0.086 0.059 0.070
a33 Intfeel 0.294 0.182 0.121 0.141
a34 Ageatim 0.795 0.379** 0.773 0.319**
a35 Wifeinge 0.442 0.258* 0.181 0.208
qHg1 Educ /10 6.578 1.257*** 3.252 0.971***
qHg2 Exper /10 9.611 7.753 -2.934 0.858***
qHg3 Exper2 /1000 -5.834 8.337 5.743 1.507***
Earnings function in Germany
j0 Constant 7.369 0.069*** 7.384 0.067*** 7.31 0.05***
j1 Educ /10 0.284 0.042*** 0.252 0.037*** 0.25 0.03***
j2 Gspeak -0.054 0.008*** -0.056 0.008*** -0.06 0.01***
j3 Unemp -0.004 0.002** -0.005 0.002** 0.00 0.00
j4 Exper /10 0.333 0.034*** 0.359 0.036*** 0.37 0.01***
j5 Exper2 /1000 -0.581 0.062*** -0.635 0.064*** -0.65 0.04***
j6 Ysm /10 0.112 0.011*** 0.111 0.011*** 0.11 0.01***
Auxiliary parameters
a3,12 Partial obs. prob. 0.103 0.028*** 0.102 0.028***
b Discount factor 0 - 0.655 0.302**
Log-L (step1) -3015.6 -3002.73
Distance MDE 0.078 0.074
Table 2: Minimum distance estimation of structural model. Asymptotic standard errors in paren-
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Parameter Variable Estimate SDE Estimate SDE
l10 Constant -1.203 0.426** -1.804 0.543***
l11 Sendcash 0.999 0.112*** 1.045 0.121***
l12 Incomesa 0.428 0.022*** 0.435 0.023***
l13 Intfeel 0.108 0.044** 0.118 0.046**
l14 Educ /10 0.034 0.248 0.039 0.254
l15 Gspeak -0.191 0.061*** -0.204 0.063***
l16 Unemp -0.091 0.018*** -0.096 0.019***
l17 Exper /10 2.090 0.178*** 2.555 0.321***
l18 Exper2 /1000 -4.541 0.324*** -5.157 0.516***
l19 Ysm /10 -0.392 0.075 -0.442 0.078***
l30 Constant -14.467 19.806 -6.239 2.386**
l31 Sendcash 0.571 0.388 0.626 0.332*
l32 Incomesa 0.089 0.091 0.094 0.071
l33 Intfeel 0.275 0.182 0.166 0.143
l34 Ageatim 0.437 0.418 0.549 0.338
l35 Wifeinge 0.420 0.258* 0.147 0.209
l36 Educ /10 5.254 1.354*** 2.786 0.976**
l37 Exper /10 -1.505 8.529 -1.338 1.021
l38 Exper2 /1000 5.768 9.339 3.586 1.609**
a3,12 Partial obs. prob. 0.117 0.033*** 0.112 0.031***
b Discount factor 0 - 0.618 0.342*
Log-L -3015.6 -3002.73
j0 Constant 7.754 0.220*** 7.568 0.242***
j1 Educ / 10 0.229 0.045*** 0.240 0.037***
j2 Gspeak -0.054 0.008*** -0.054 0.008***
j3 Unemp 0.007 0.003** 0.007 0.003**
j4 Exper / 10 0.367 0.050*** 0.349 0.048***
j5 Exper / 1000 -0.669 0.102*** -0.622 0.097***
j6 Ysm / 10 0.126 0.011*** 0.126 0.011***
t2 Work selection 0.239 0.091** 0.169 0.101*
t3 Outmigration selection -0.038 0.009*** -0.044 0.009***
Table 5: Maximum likelihood estimates of reduced form model. Asymptotic standard errors in

























































































































































































































































































































Figure 2: Goodness of ﬁt of the model. Real (R) and simulated (S) frequencies of each alternative
over the 1987 and 1999 period. Simulations are performed by taking for each individual and each
time period 1000 draws from the extreme-value distribution. The simulations are obtained by
averaging over individuals and draws the predicted frequency of each choice.
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Figure 3: Simulated distributions for the forward looking model. Percentages are obtained by
simulating 10000 choice sequences and averaging the predicted migration durations over all se-
quences. Benchmark is a 30 year old immigrant, who migrated to Germany four years ago, has
10 years of education, 8 years of experience, does not return money to his native country, speaks
below average German (4 on the scale from 1 to 5), is not married, has a reported satisfaction with
income of 3 (on the scale from 0 to 10), lives in a province with unemployment rate of 8% and has
an average earnings of 1000 DM.
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Figure 4: Simulated distributions for the myopic looking model. Percentages are obtained by
simulating 10000 choice sequences and averaging the predicted migration durations over all se-
quences. Benchmark is a 30 year old immigrant, who migrated to Germany four years ago, has
10 years of education, 8 years of experience, does not return money to his native country, speaks
below average German (4 on the scale from 1 to 5), is not married, has a reported satisfaction with
income of 3 (on the scale from 0 to 10), lives in a province with unemployment rate of 8% and has
an average earnings of 1000 DM
31References
BELLEMARE, C. (2004): “IdentiﬁcationandEstimationofEconomicModelsofOutmigrationUsing
Panel Attrition,” Working paper, IZA Discussion Paper no. 1065.
BELLMAN, R. (1957): Dynamic Programming. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
B¨ OHNING, W. (1987): Studies in International Migration. St. Martin’s Press, New-York.
BOUND, J., C. BROWN, AND N. MATHIOWETZ (2001): Measurement Error in Survey Datavol. 5,
chap. 59, pp. 3705–3843. Elsevier, North-Holland.
CARRINGTON, W. J., E. DETRAGIACHE, AND T. VISHWANATH (1996): “Migration with Endoge-
nous Moving Costs,” American Economic Review, 86(4), 909–930.
CHAMBERLAIN, G. (1984): Panel Datavol. 2 of Handbook of Econometrics, chap. 22, pp. 1248–1318.
North-Holland.
CLARK, W. A., AND A. I. DREVER (2001): “Do Immigrants Improve their Housing Quality
When They Move ? Evidence from the German Socio-Economic Panel,” Vierteljahrshefte Zur
Wirtschaftsforschung, 70, 87–94.
COHEN, S., AND Z. ECKSTEIN (2002): “Labor Mobility of Immigrants: Training, Experience, Lan-
guage and Opportunities,” Working paper, Tel-Aviv University.
DJAJIC, S., AND R. MILBOURNE (1988): “A General Equilibrium Model of Guest Worker Migra-
tion,” Journal of Internation Economics, 25, 335–351.
DUBIN, J., AND D. MCFADDEN (1984): “An Econometric Analysis of Residential Electric Appli-
ance Holdings and Consumption,” Econometrica, 52, 345–362.
DUSTMANN, C. (1994): “Return Intentions of Migrants: Theory and Evidence,” Discussion paper,
CEPR Discussion paper no. 906.
(2003): “Return migration, wage differentials, and the optimal migration duration,” Euro-
pean Economic Review, 47, 353–369.
DUSTMANN, C., AND O. KIRCHKAMP (2002): “The Optimal Migration Duration and Activity
Choice After Re-Migration,” Journal of Development Economics, 67, 351–372.
EDIN, P.-A., R. J. LALONDE, AND O. ASLUND (2000): “Emigration of Immigrants and Measures
ofImmigrantAssimilation: EvidencefromSweden,”SwedishEconomicPolicyReview, 7, 163–204.
GLYTSOS, N. P. (1988): “Remittances and Temporary Migration: A Theoritical Model and its Test-
ing with the Greek-German Experience,” Weltwirtschaﬂiches Archiv, 124, 524–549.
HARRIS, J. R., AND M. P. TODARO (1970): “Migration, Unemployment, and Development: A
Two-Sector Analysis,” American Economic Review, 60, 126–142.
HAUSMAN, J., J. ABREVAYA, AND F. SCOTT-MORTON (1998): “Misclassiﬁcation of a Dependent
Variable in a Discrete Response Setting,” Journal of Econometrics, 87, 239–269.
PANNENBERG, M. (1998): “Documentation of Sample Sizes and Panel Attrition in the German
Socio Economic Panel,” DIW Discussion Paper No. 172.
32PESSINO, C. (1991): “Sequential Migration Theory and Evidence from Peru,” Journal of Develop-
ment Economics, 36, 55–87.
PISCHKE, J.-S., AND J. VELLING (1997): “Employment Effects of Immigration to Germany: An
Analysis Based on Local Labor Markets,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 79, 594–604.
RUST, J. (1988): “Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Discrete Control Processes,” SIAM Journal
on Control and Optimization, 26, 1006–1023.
SCHULTZ, T. P. (1998): “Immigrant Quality and Assimilation - A Review of the US Literature,”
Journal of Population Economics, 11(2), 239–252.
SJAASTAD, L. (1962): “The Coststs and Returns of Human Migration,” Journal of Political Economy,
70(Suppl.), 80–93.
STARK, O. (1998): On the Microeconomics of Return Migrationchap. 3, pp. 32–41.
VAN DER KLAAUW, W. (1996): “Female Labour Supply and Marital Decisions: A Life-Cycle
Model,” Review of Economic Studies, 63(2), 199–235.
33